In this paper, we extend dynamic logic with the concept of an actor in order to be able to specify who takes the initiative of an action, who makes a choice, or who controis a synchronization of actions. We give two examples of application of this idea.
Introduction

Internal choice and internal events
sketches an intuitive picture of black box M equipped with buttons that may or may not be blocked by M, and if not blocked, can be pushed by an observer O. If M has two buttons, a and b, that are unblocked, then O is in a position to choose whether to push one or the other button. Using CSPlike notation, the process executed is then a + b, where + stands for external choice. If, on the other hand, M chooses to blocks one or the other button, then the process executed is a • b, where ~ stands for internal choice.
This vivid example can be generalized to the case of n actors for any n > 1, by allowing any actor to make a choice.. The distinction between internal and external then loses its meaning, for we will not identify with any actor in the system. We will write t:(x + y) for the process that actor t makes a choice between processes x and y.
In CCS, internal choice between a and b is represented by "ca + xb, where "c is any action initiated by M.
• is called the internal or invisible action. It is well-known that the axiomatization of x is not very intuitive, and De Nicola and Hennessy [27] show how to eliminate ~ from CCS in favor of the intuitively more pleasing internal and external choice of CSP [15] . We think x contains two ideas that should be distinguished, connected to initiative and visibility. "c is any action that occurs on the initiative of M as well as any action that is invisible to O. Separating these two concepts and generalizing to the case of n actors, we will explicitly add initiative to any event and leave open the question to which actors an event occurrence is visible. Thus, M :a is event a initiated by M, and O :a is a initiated by O. Note that xa + zb states that M makes a choice by performing an invisible action. Choice is itself not seen as an action, so that a property of + is expressed by a property of the first event of the branches. This makes it difficult to interpret terms like a + xb, where it is hard to say whether choice is internal or external [27] .
The paradox of free choice permission
Deontic logic is the logic of permissions, prohibitions, and obligations [1, 9, 18, 28] . Recently, deontic logic has been applied to the specification of software systems [8, 20, 21, 31, 22, 30] . Traditionally, deontic logic has been plagued by numerous paradoxes. Castafieda and von Wright [5, 32] have proposed that a number of these paradoxes can be resolved by distinguishing actions from states. This approach has been formalized in [24, 25] using dynamic logic [13] . The basic idea is to label the set of possible states as either forbidden or permitted, and to define any action that leads to a forbidden state as forbidden. Permission and obligation can then be defined in a standard way in terms of prohibition.
One paradox still remains, however, called the paradox of free choice permission [14, 19] . This is that the following formula is derivable (P (a) says that event a is permitted):
(1) P(buy chewing gum) --> P(buy chewing gum + shoot the president).
This paradox can be resolved using the distinction between internal and external choice [23] . Permission to do a means that there is a way of doing a that leads to a permitted state of the world. One readhag of (1) is therefore intuitively plausible, viz. if there is a way to chew gum that leads to a permitted state, then there is a way to perform the process (buy chewing gum + shoot the president) that leads to a permitted world (viz. by performing the permitted way to chew gum). On the other hand, it is counterintuitive to conclude from P(chew gum) that I am permitted to choose between chewing gum and shooting the president. Thus, (2) is a formalization of our intuition and (3) is not:
(2) P(tl:at)--->P(t2:(tl:a +h:b)) (3)* P(tl:al) --> P(tl:(tl:a +tl:b)) (2) says that there is a possibility that t2 makes the choice in such a way that a permitted world will ensue after performing the chosen action. (3) makes the incorrect statement that if I am permitted to do something, then I permitted to choose to do something else as well. The force of the permission P (t1:(tx :a + tl :b) is stronger than that of P (t2 :(1i :a + tl :b), because in addition to saying that there is a possibility that tl chooses a permitted action, it says that 11 is permitted to choose between the actions. In our system, (2) is a theorem and (3) is not. In fact, we have the theorems (4) P (t2 :(tl :a -t-l 1 :b)) <---> P (tl :a) v e (tl :b) (5) P (tl :(tl :a + ll :b)) ---> P (t 1 :a) ^ e (t 1 :b), which agrees with our intuitions. (5) blocks the paradox of free choice permission.
Dynamic logic with equality and action negation
We specify a system as a set of possible states which all contain an underlying abstract data type (ADT)
as reduct. Events and processes will be specified as functions on the set of possible states. Thus, the system is a Kripke structure with multiple accessibility relationships, one for each event and process. More in detail, we model any system as shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1.
Each world in the set PW of possible worlds contains the underlying ADT, called dAOr, as reduct. In addition, there is an algebra dProces s of processes, together with a function p which, for each process, yields a function on PW that states the effect of the process on the possible worlds. The process algebra also contains the underlying ADT as reduct. To make this more precise, we first rehearse some of the definitions relevant to equational specification of ADT's.
ADT specification
An ADT signature Sig is a pair ((S, < ), F), where (S, -< ) a poset of sort names and IF a set of function declarations over S. Goguen & Meseguer [12] show that under certain weak conditions, the terms of an ADT signature always have a least sort.
Let SigADT be an ADT signature. A SigADT-Specificadon is a pair (SigADT, E), where E is a set of equations over Sigm~r..We assume the initial semantics of ADT specifications [7, 10,1 I, 12, 29] .
Process specification with negation
By a "specification" we mean a set of axioms in a language that is used to select an intended model.
By a "definition" we mean a formula that must be solved in a given model. The solution set of the formula in the model is the set of all elements of the model that satisfy the formula.
We extend the ADT specification SpeCADT tO a process specification Speceroces~ by adding declarations of sort-and function names, and equations, where one sort in the process specification will be called the process sort. = pay(S1 + $i).
To be able to refer to persons and libraries as actors, we simply assume that the underlying ADT if not ((i0 eq il) and (i0 eq i2)) = true then -(i0:(il:el & i2:e2)) = i0:(-il:el + end spec StepAxioms -i2:e2)
We use the convention that n-ary operators bind stronger than m-ary operators, n<m, but if we wish we can add brackets to emphasize operator binding, We use a as metavariable over terms of sort STEP and 11 as metavariable over SCHEDULING_STEP. It is easily shown that 11 either is a negated action or has the form t:a. In general, t:a says that actor t takes the initiative to the scheduling step a, or schedules a. 11 may be an atomic event a. In t:any, t executes any atomic event, and in t:fail, t deadlocks, u(111 + 112) denotes the choice of t between al and ct2, u(111 & 112) denotes the choice of t to let al and (X 2 OCCUr synchronously, and -11 denotes the non-occurrence of 11.
In [S4-5], we assume that a Boolean function eq with infix notation is defined for each actor sort, which is true iff its arguments are equal. The axioms require multi-actor steps to be a Boolean algebra. The intuition behind this is that the effect of not making a choice between al and a2 is the same as the effect of not doing al and ~2. We call this the "extensional reading" of choice, by which we mean that they make De Morgan's laws valid in the semantics. In a single-actor step, we use what we will call an "intensional reading", and look at the choice of the single actor as an event in itself.
On that reading, choice and synchronization are simply different actions and the axioms [ s4-5 ] do not hold. We come back to this in the discussion after theorem 8, where the difference between the two choices is made more precise.
To make matters as simple as possible, we use the initial algebra of the process specification as intended semantics dtproces s All closed process terms (and in particular all step terms) are then interpreted as their equivalence class with respect to the listed process and step axioms. This does not provide any meaning as far as the effect of a process on the set of possible worlds is concerned. The function P on derocess will assign such a meaning, by defining P(13) to be a (non-deterministic) function on possible worlds.
StepAxioms is notable for the axioms that are absent. For example, associativity of choice is standard in all process algebras. With initiative we would get There are no derivability relations between these axioms, because for that we need the extra axioms (6) -t:any = t:fail and (7) -ufail = uany.
These last axioms enforce the intuitive interpretation "t does something other than ~, or deadlocks" to -t:ct. We will use the weaker interpretation '% does something other than tx, or deadlocks, or another actor does something", which is easier to formalize. A third, more stringent, interpretation would be '% does something other than ct, but does not deadlock", which is enforced by (8) t0:(-t:t~ + t:~) = t:any and (9) t0:(-t:~ & t:~) = t:fail.
(6) and (7) are derivable from (8) and (9). We will keep our process specification simple by omitting all these axioms.
The sort PROCESS below is the process sort of our process specification. To keep matters simple, we do not allow negation of processes, although this has been formalized in an earlier version of the language [6, 24] and can easily be added here. We use [~ as metavariable over terms of sort PROCESS. We use the convention that : binds stronger than ;. Note that if i deadlocks, other actors can still display initiative as if nothing happened.
process spec ProcessAxioms import
We are able to express three different kinds of nondeterminism in this specification. Choice is "non-deterministic" in the sense that it is arbitrary; it is not specified which branch is taken. In a two-actor environment with actors M and O, M:(al + ~(2) is "non-deterministic" in the sense that O has no control over the choice (this is CSP-like nondeterminism [15] ). Finally, ~0:(l:a ; x +l.:a ; y) is the usual concept of nondeterminism as formalized in process algebra [2, 3, 4] , where there action ~:a can lead to one out of a set of possible states. The language Loyn(SigDyn) of dynamic constraints, with typical elements dp and W, is given by the BNF:
Dynamic logic with equality
where ~ is a formula of Lsta~(Sigstca) and 13 is a process term over Sigprocess. We use
The intuitive semantics of [ [3] @ is "after execution of [3, @ holds necessarily", and the intuitive semantics of (13}@ is "after execution of [3, dp may hold". The language can thus be used to express pre-and postconditions of events. Note that by our definition of LDyn(Sigoyn)-formulas, process terms can only occur inside the modal operator. A dynamic logic formula containing no modal operators is a static constraint formula, which may be an equation over SigADT. 
SpeCDy n = (SigDyn
Th ( Spec stat) = Th ( SpeC Dyn)C'~ Stat( Si g stat ) arid Th (Specproces s) = Th (SpeeDy n)t'~LProces s (Sigproces s ).
A dynamic constraint specification thus conservatively extends both the static constraint specification and the process specification. An example dynamic constraint specification is dynamic constraint spec DynamicLibrary import We will therefore omit the subscript from ~ from now on.
Inference rules and semantics
Let SpeCDy n = (SigDyn
The inference rules of dynamic logic are given in table 1.
All axioms and theorems of first-order logic. It must be noted which axioms from standard dynamic logic are absent, viz.
[DL2] [131 ; [32] We drop the subscript from t--from now on.
]-Stat
Theorem 1.
SpeCDy n ~-¢P iff SpecDyn ~ 0.
Sketch of proof.
Soundness is easy to prove. [17] , this implies that every consistent formula can be satisfied by a Kripke model with this property. By contraposition, we obtain completeness under the assumption that we can always prove 131 = 132 whenever this holds. But the truth of that assumption follows from the completeness of equational logic. •
Theorem 2.
The following theorems hold in SpecDyn.
[Dynl] [13] For , see [24] . [Dyn6-8] follow from [$2] and the step axioms for our process theory, • These theorems do not relate the internal structure of • to the internal structure of 13 in [1510. The truth of formulas that express such a relation depends upon the behavioral semantics of process terms, to which we now turn.
A model for free choice
Assuming the initial semantics for SpeCADT and Specprocess, all the models of a dynamic specification differ only in their behavioral semantics, i.e. in the function p. We therefore select a particular intended model by defining the function p. First, we assume a function
effect (a)(c) defines the effect of an atomic event on the state of the world. In general, a dynamic logic specification does not determine the effect of events exhaustively. Several effect functions remain possible with respect to a given specification, and we need a kind of frame assumption to choose between these possibilities. For example, one can stipulate that whatever is not specified to change does not change when an atomic event is applied. We leave open how effect is chosen, and require only that the function satisfies
where the model .~Oyn is left understood. To define
we define a set of functions PW ---o PW to each Ix e TsTE~(X). We do this inductively. First, we need the domain of synchronization sets The set of all (compatible and incompatible) synchronization sets is called SYN and has metavariable s. The set oft-synchronization events is SYN ~ = {s e SYN I t:a e s for an a}. 1
Definition 4.
Ifs e SYN is compatible, then we define effect(s) e (E ----} (PW --~ Y)(PW))) by effect ( s )( (~) = effect ( a 1 )( (y) ..... effect (a n)((y)
wi us y, where S f contains only elements of the form ufail and none of the ai has this form.
STEP is built from terms of the form t:~, where ~ is a scheduling step, i.e. a term containing any, fail, -, +, or ;.
Definition 5.
The set of steps is defined as
STEP = ~+ (~(SYN)).
The function
step: TsTEp(X)k.){uany, t:fail I t e TACTOR} ----> STEP is defined inductively as follows.
1. For TAcTioN(X)-terms, we define step(a)={seSYNlaes and s compatible} for a 6 TACTIoN(X ).
2. step (t:faii) = {s e SYN I t:fail c s and s is compatible}.
step (t:any) = {s e SYN ~ I s is compatible}. •
A step is !hus a set of the form
step (a) is the step consisting of all synchronization sets in which a participates. It is an element of ~'(SgN), so the codomain of step is ~(~(SYN)). Because step never maps a step term to the empty set, we can eliminate this from the codomain.
The behavioral interpretation of a thus involves nondeterminism of the underspecification variety, because it is interpreted as "a occurs, together with a finite set of other events, bat I don't know (specify, care) which other events". This interpretation is crucial for the possibility to give a behavioral interpretation to action negation. We first give a behavioral semantics for step terms only, and then make a minor modification, which gives us the intended behavioral semantics for all process terms.
In our step specification, we have
where ACTION is the sort of terms l:a, for a an elementary event.
4. Actions are negated with respect to all possible steps. Thus, -t:a is the set of all possible synchronization sets in which t does not participate with a: These are the synchronization sets in which 1. participates with another event, or with fail, or in which l does not participate at all.
Choice makes p deliver a function PW ~ ~(PW) rather than PW ----> PW.
In general, each set • has a set of possible next worlds, one of which will be actually reached when executing the step. The intuitive notion captured by this semantic definition is that if t o chooses between two steps, the set of possible next world that may result from his choice is the union of the sets of possible next worlds reachable by the branches. Note that, if p(tXl)(G)(w) for i = 1, 2 consists of compatible synchronization sets, then so does p(t:(lxl + tt2))(cr)(w).
6. If the three actors involved are the same, then we capture a quite different intuition with the semantics, viz. what the effect of t's choice itself is, rather than what the effect of the chosen branches is. It says that the effect of the making the choice itself is the intersection of the effects of the branches. This agrees with our stronger interpretation of P (t:(l:a + t:b)), which says that t is permitted to do a and b (just as in the multi-actor case), and in addition that t is permitted to make the choice.
7. There are no special considerations for synchronization that distinguish the single-actor from the multi-actor case. tz I & ~x 2 is the synchronous execution of two steps, and the effect wilt be brought about by those functions on PW that bring about the effect of ot 1 and et 2. Hence, we intersect the steps. Note that the effect of this synchronous execution is the same as the effect of the choice event in a single-actor choice between t:Ctl and t:o~ 2. This is compatible with the process terms whose effect this is, being unequal. Note that Ix, and a2 may be incompatible, so that there is no synchronization set in which both participate. For incompatible steps ~t 1 and a 2, we have p(t:(tx l & Ix2))(t~)(w)= O. This has an important consequence for the logic, which we will see below.
We call this model a free choice model because it allows us to differentiate a choice imposed on an actor by another actor from a choice made freely by the actor himself,
Theorem 7.
• //f is a model of Specoyn.
Sketch of proof.
We simply prove that p applied to both sides of each axiom in StepAxioms yields the same result.
This equality will then be maintained in any equation derivable from the axioms. The proof is simple and is omitted.
•
Theorem 8.
//tO, tl and t 2 are not all equal, then the following formulas are true in~tf. IF2] represents our "extensional" reading of a multi-actor choice. ~ may be true after t 0's choice iff it may be true as an effect of cq or a2. By the duality [a]47 -=-, (a)-~ O, we have IF1], saying that • will be true after t0's choice iff it will be true after ~1 and o;2.
In a single-actor choice, [F4] reflects our "intensional" reading that if O may be the effect of t's choice, then it may be the effect of each of the branches. The arrow goes only one way, because there may not be any joint effect of a I and ct 2 at all, viz. when they are incompatible. However, if there is an effect, i.e. if there is a • with (t:(t:ct 1 +t:tx2))~ , then we can conclude that (t:al)~ ^ (t:tx2)q~. To understand the dual formula in [F3], we must realize that choice is an event that occurs before the branches are executed. Choice does not bring us to a next possible world, but it does occur at a point in time preceding the execution of a 1 and tx 2. The left-hand side of IF4] then says "after l's choice, the system is in a state where 47 can be brought about", which implies the right-hand side, both branches can bring about 47. Applying the duality, the left-hand side becomes "it is not the case that after t's choice, the system is in a state where --, 47 can be brought about", which is equivalent to "after t's choice, tile system can be in a state where dp will be brought about". This is the correct reading of the left-hand side of [F3], and it is implied by the right-hand side, which says that one of the branches will bring about cI,.
3. Synchronous execution is impossible if the synchronized steps are incompatible, so there is a oneway arrow here as well. The logic is not able to express necessary conditions for two steps to be compatible. This is a general problem with the intersection of accessibility relations in a Kripke model with multiple accessibility relations, that can only be solved by strengthening the language. Meyer [25] did this by adding DONE :¢x predicates to the language, but Van der Hoek and Meyer [16] show how to do this in general.
To give a behavioral semantics of process terms, we must extend the definition of p to T~Roczss(X). The basic idea is simply that the effect of the sequence operator ; on the world is simply a composition of the effect functions of its arguments. The only complication is that deadlock should remain local, so that, for example (see [P4-5] in ProcessAxioms) p(ufail ; 131 ; t:(x ; 132) = p(ufail ; 131 ; 132).
Other actors can continue even when t gets stuck. The easiest way is to define p for terms in which all occurrences of t after it has failed are removed, and then extend the definition to other process terms that are in its congruence class.
Definition 10.
Let ~ e TpRoc~ss(X).
1. Every nested application of the ; operator in ~ is called a sequence. The following is easy to prove.
Lemma 11.
In the specification ProcessAxioms, For any [~ e TvRocEss(X) there is a unique non-redundant PROCESS-term equal to it. •
Definition 12.
Extend the definition of p as follows.
P: TpRocEss(X) ---> (Z --~ (PW --~ ~(PW)))
is defined inductively by This formalization of deontic logic has been studied in dynamic logic without actors in [24, 25] and has been applied to system specification in [31, 30] . With actors, the modatities express more. For example, P(t:a) says that t is permitted do to a, and P(u(t:a + t:b)) says that t is permitted to choose between doing a or b (i.e. choosing brings him into a state where he can do a permitted action).
Theorem 16.
If t0, tl and t2 are not all equal, then the following formulas are true in JAr.
[Pl] [P2] P(to:(tl :cq + t2 :a2)) 60 P(tl :oq) v P(t2:a2) [P4] P(u(t:al + t:a2)) --> P(l:al) ^ P(t:a2)
[P6t
